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The Supreme Court's Use of Statutory
Interpretation: Morris v. Gressette,
APA Nonreviewability, and the
Idea of a Legislative Scheme
Beginning in 1967 with its decision in Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner,' the Supreme Court expanded judicial reviewability of ad-
ministrative decisions under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA).2 A later case, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 3 strengthened the impression that the Court was unwilling to
withhold judicial review of an administrative action when such a pre-
clusion of review was not explicitly contained in the relevant statute.
4
In 1977, however, the Court in Morris v. Gressette5 withdrew from this
position by holding nonreviewable the Attorney General's decision not
to challenge a South Carolina election law under section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965,0 even though review was not explicitly
precluded by the statute.
This Note examines analytical problems in implying APA non-
reviewability common to Morris and Overton Park. The focus will be
on the Court's reasoning in each case, rather than on abstract principles
of reviewability.7 In resolving questions of implied APA nonreview-
ability,8 the Court in these cases failed to analyze the relevant statute
either carefully or consistently. Based on a close reading of the two
cases and the statutes they construe, this Note proposes a course of
1. 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (regulations governing generic names in drug labeling and ad.
vertising reviewable in pre-enforcement suit for declaratory and injunctive relief).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976).
3. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
4. See pp. 1656-64 infra (discussion of Overton Park). For examples of other cases
contributing to this trend, see Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598 (1970); Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
5. 432 U.S. 491 (1977); see 1643-56 infra.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
7. See GelIhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLU,f. L. REV.
771, 780 (1975) ("In expressing our suspicion that the rules governing judicial review have
no more substance at the core than a seedless grape, we profess no unique insight.");
Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition: A Discipline in Search of an Organizing Prin-
ciple, 72 Nw. U.L. Rav. 120, 128, 130 (1977) (Supreme Court administrative law opinions
ignore process and policy concerns, thus producing judicial review with "disembodied,
abstract quality").
8. See pp. 1637-40 infra.
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inquiry that gives specific content to the idea, discussed in Morris, of
a "legislative scheme." 9
Part I of the Note briefly surveys the issue of implied APA non-
reviewability and frames that issue as a twofold problem of statutory
interpretation; it is necessary to interpret both the APA and the ad-
ministrative statute applicable to the particular controversy. The pro-
posed course of inquiry into the entire legislative scheme is based on
the analysis in the Morris opinion, which is discussed in Part II. Serious
interpretive flaws in that opinion demonstrate the need for a more
methodical approach. Part III, therefore, suggests certain refinements
of the Morris analysis. Finally, the improved version of this course of
inquiry is defended by a demonstration of how its use in Overton Park
might have led to a different and more thoroughly reasoned interpreta-
tion of the pertinent statutes.
I. Implying APA Nonreviewability-A Twofold Problem of
Statutory Interpretation
A. Interpreting the APA
The Administrative Procedure Act was passed in 194610 to ensure
that federal agencies grew and functioned within the bounds of due
process and accountability essential to American government.1 Section
10 provides generally for judicial review of agency action; it codifies the
prior doctrine' 2 that courts may inquire whether an agency action was
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law"'13 and should therefore be overturned. Section 10
presents a formidable problem of statutory interpretation, because its
general provision for judicial review has two exceptions-for cases
where "statutes preclude judicial review" or where "agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law."'14
The tension between these two exceptions and section 10's tenor in
favor of review has generated a vigorous and long-lived controversy. 15
9. See 1640-42 infra.
10. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (current version at 5 U.S.C.
§3 551-559, 701-706 (1976)).
11. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36-45 (1950).
12. For a discussion of pre-APA judicial review of administrative action, see L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION 339-53, 372-76 (1965); Note, Statutory Pre-
clusion of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 1976 DuKE L.J. 431,
432-37.
13. APA § 10(e)(B)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
14. APA § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)-(2) (1976).
15. For conflicting views on this controversy, see Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness:
A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965, 966 n.9 (1969) (citing authorities).
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The precise importance of the bifurcation is unclear: it is most im-
portant to note that judicial review may be precluded by implication",
and that implied preclusion may be based on either exception.17
Scholars have attempted to clarify the two exceptions by drawing on
general conceptions of judicial review and administrative discretion.
The desire to shield the exercise of agency discretion from judicial re-
view has been explained or supported by reference to tradition,, to
the nature of the subject matter under the agency's purview,' or to
the possible effects of review on agency efficiency.20 On the other hand,
the agency's performance may indicate the need for a stronger judicial
role in the "partnership" between court and agency, 2 1 or there may be
16. Both before and after the enactment of the APA the Court has found judicial
review of administrative action to be precluded by implication. See Morris v. Gressette, 432
U.S. 491 (1977); Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
17. There is disagreement about the definition of each exception. The range of possible
understandings of the meaning of "committed to agency discretion" is divided into several
discrete formulations in Note, Discretion in a Crystal Closet: Applying a Systemic Ap-
proach to Determine the Reviewability of Agency Discretion, 3 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 452, 456-74
(1972). Some commentators view the exception very narrowly. See L. JAFFE, supra note
12, at 374; Berger, supra note 15, at 970-72.
According to some definitions, the two exceptions overlap. For example, both excep-
tions may cover an implicit preclusion, and congressional "intent," see note 38 infra, may
be relevant to either one. See Consumer Fed'n of America v. FTC, 515 F.2d 367, 369-73
(D.C. Cir. 1975); K. DAvis, AvMINISTRATIV" Lkv TREATISE 945-51, 964-90 (Supp. 1970);
Davis, "Judicial Control of Administrative Action": A Review, 66 COLum. L. REV. 635, 651
(1966) (book review of L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTPTIvE ACTION (1965)) (both
preclusion of review and action committed to agency discretion may be revealed im-
plicitly, e.g., by congressional intent). But see Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A
Sequel, 51 MINN. L. REV. 601, 628-29 (1967) ("statutes preclude review" refers only to
preclusion on face of statute).
For this reason, there is disagreement over whether the bifurcation itself is analytically
useful. For opposing views on this question, see Berger, supra at 622-23, 628-30; Davis,
Administrative Arbitrariness Is Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. REv. 643, 652 n.30
(1967); Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency
Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REv. 367, 377 n.43 (1968) (claiming distinction insignificant). The
Supreme Court has not spoken definitively about the bifurcation issue. Instead, when it
has been confronted with statutes not explicitly precluding review, it has used statutory
interpretation both in decisions such as Overton Park that refer to one of the exceptions,
see pp. 1639-40 infra, and in decisions such as Morris that only discuss preclusion by
implication generally, see pp. 1645-46 & note 64 infra.
18. See, e.g., J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SysTEt 861-69 (1975) (decisions involving award of government contracts, management of
public lands, defense, and foreign affairs generally held nonreviewable); Rosenblum, A
New Look at the General Counsel's Unreviewable Discretion Not to Issue a Complaint
Under the NLRA, 86 YALE L.J. 1349, 1349-59, 1371-85 (1977) (NLRB General Counsel's
unreviewable discretion taken for granted as established doctrine).
19. K. DAVIs, supra note 17, at 965 (Supp. 1970).
20. See Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 303 (2d Cir. 1971) (judicial
review of FHA approvals of rent increases would interfere with "need for expedition");
Saferstein, supra note 17, at 382-95 (1968) (discussing efficiency factors).
21. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (supervisory function of judicial review is "partnership"
between agency and court in which court ensures that agency has carefully considered
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a perceived need to adapt the governing statute to changed conditions.22
These considerations have been used in arguments against insulating
discretion from review, since review would further basic goals of the
agency. Moreover, judicial review of some discretionary agency actions
has been further justified as a way to protect important individual
rights 2 3 or group interests neglected by an imperfect political process. 24
All of these considerations are, however, problematic in two respects.
First, they are for the most part too general; they do not relate the non-
reviewability question to the actual operation of the relevant statute
or to congressional policy in passing the statute. The pertinence of any
one of these considerations depends on other determinations-whether,
for example, one can discern a congressional purpose to administer a
particular statute primarily to secure a basic constitutional right,
rather than to achieve efficiency in a given area of commerce. 25 Second,
although the Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that there is a
weighty presumption in favor of review, which can be displaced only
by a showing of "clear and convincing evidence" to the contrary,26 it
has never adopted any of the principles described above. This Note,
therefore, does not attempt to discover a uniform Supreme Court
theory for implying APA nonreviewability.
In examining the way the Court analyzed the nonreviewability issue
in Morris v. Gressette27 and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe,2s the Note will concentrate primarily on method rather than
result. Both opinions based their inferences about implied preclusion
salient problems); Mahinka, The Problem of Nonreviewability: Judicial Control of Action
Committed to Agency Discretion, 20 VILL. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (1974) (judicial review can
foster proper administrative performance); cf. Note, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe: Environmental Law and the Scope of Judicial Review, 24 STAN. L. REV.
1117, 1126 n.56 (1972) (Supreme Court's reasoning may "mask" doubts about agency's
effectiveness in carrying out congressional purpose).
22. See, e.g., Mahinka, supra note 21, at 45-48 (1974) (courts should pressure agencies
to consider new public policies and goals).
23. Id. at 39-41.
24. See Stewart, Paradoxes of Liberty, Integrity and Fraternity: The Collective Nature
of Environmental Quality and Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 7 ENVr'L L. 463,
478-84 (1977) (discussing courts' role in interest-representation model of administrative
law); Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in
Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62
IOWA L. REV. 713, 750-58, 767-69 (1977) (courts may intervene to promote a diversity of
values overlooked by legislature).
25. See Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning: "The
Middle Road": 1, 40 TEx. L. REV. 751, 796-800 (1962) (discussing many types of legislative
purpose).
26. E.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1975); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159, 166-67 (1970); Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962).
27. 432 U.S. 491 (1977).
28. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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of review on an interpretation of the governing administrative statute,
although the holdings and methods of the opinions differed. In Over-
ton Park, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, equated the "com-
mitted to agency discretion" exception with a statement in the APA's
legislative history that review is only precluded when " 'statutes are
drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to
apply.' ",29 The Court did not explicitly identify a method by which
one might interpret a statute to determine whether there was "law to
apply" in reviewing agency action. The opinion did suggest, however,
that a statute giving an agency a narrow and specific mandate argued
for review while a statute allowing a wide-ranging balancing of in-
terests argued against reviewability.30
In Morris the Court found that review was precluded by implication
and based this finding on an examination of " 'the entire legislative
scheme.' "31 Although this Note argues that the Morris Court reached
an incorrect result, its mode of analysis is potentially a more thorough
and precise way of interpreting statutes to determine implicit non-
reviewability.
B. "Legislative Scheme": A Problem in Statutory Interpretation
A court confronted with the contention that a given action is im-
pliedly nonreviewable must engage in interstitial lawmaking: since the
statute is by hypothesis silent on the subject of judicial review, the
question must be resolved in a way that is consistent with all the goals
and means of the legislation3 2 The problem is that this task is often
undertaken without any clear sense of the analytic steps that should
be followed. This uncertainty may be partially explained by the con-
cerns that are characteristic of the literature about statutory construc-
tion. Catalogues of maxims and "rules" of construction, 33 discussion
of cognitive and epistemological riddles implicit in the idea of a
collective legislative "purpose,"34 as well as arguments over the juris-
29. 401 U.S. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 26 (1945)).
30. 401 U.S. at 411-13.
31. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 501 (1977) (quoting Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)).
32. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1413-16 (tent. ed. 1958); Kennedy,
Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 395-96 (1973); Witherspoon, supra note 25, at 822-
48 (purposes of statute must guide its application even with respect to issues not explicitly
addressed by statute).
33. See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950).
34. See MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966); Radin, Statutory Inter-
pretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930).
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prudential implications and principles of judicial lawmakin 3 5 have
all diverted the attention of scholars. As a result, little academic
wisdom is available to a judge trying to define the "entire legislative
scheme" in a given case,30 although some guidance may be derived
from prior judicial opinions.37 The course of inquiry implicit in the
Morris opinion points toward some concrete features of an administra-
tive mechanism that can be discerned in its statutory blueprint and
thus can aid in resolving questions of implied nonreviewability.
As will be seen below, four lines of inquiry are present in the Morris
Court's analysis of legislative scheme. The analysis starts from a pre-
sumption in favor of judicial review, then progresses by inquiring into
the statute's purpose,38 the scope of administrative authority it grants,
and the possible impact of review on administration of the statute, only
35. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593,
606-15 (1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARv. L. REv. 630, 661-69 (1958) (general discussion of interpretive problems and discre-
tion of judge applying legal rule).
36. The problem of furthering a legislative purpose in cases that are clearly within
the ambit of a statute but are not covered by a specific provision of the statute has been
neglected. R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 250-51 (1975).
Yet that is the very problem presented in implying nonreviewability. This is because most
inquiries into the purpose or "equity" of a statute were for a long time undertaken in
order to carve out an exception to, or to justify the extension of, the otherwise manifest
scope of a statute. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARV. LEGAL ESSAYS
213, 218-30 (1934) ("equity" of statute may be used by courts to extend statute's coverage
to analogous cases); Note, The Legitimacy of Civil Law Reasoning in the Common Law:
Justice Harlan's Contribution, 82 YALE L.J. 258, 261-69, 279-80 (1972) (discussing technique
of reasoning by analogy from statutes to create new law).
37. Justice Harlan was especially perceptive in delineating a legislative scheme. See,
e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 230 (1966) (dissenting from Court's
holding gasoline accidentally discharged "refuse matter" under § 13 of Rivers and
Harbors Act); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 493-510 (1960) (dissent-
ing from Court's holding fluid industrial discharge an "obstruction" under § 10 of
Rivers and Harbors Act). In the area of nonreviewability, perhaps the most careful
attempt to delineate the relevant features of a "legislative scheme" is the opinion of
Judge Coffin in Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 12.43, 1249-51 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding non-
reviewable FHA approval of rent increases in subsidized housing).
38. Justice Powell not only used the word "purpose," 432 U.S. at 501 (quoting Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)), but also referred at various times to
statutory meaning in terms such as what might be "inferred," congressional "desire," and
what Congress "intended." Id. at 501, 503, 504. The terms "legislative purpose" and "legis-
lative intent" are often confused. See, e.g., Breitel, The Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL
INSTITUTIONs TODAY AND ToMIORROW 1, 27-28 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959) (using both terms, ap-
parently treating them as synonymous); Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statu-
tory Interpretation, 3 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 13-16 (1954) (noting interchangeability of terms).
To the extent that the two terms have distinct meanings, "intent" is a narrower concept
referring to a volitional or cognitive state with respect to a specific issue, word, or ques-
tion, while "purpose" is a broader concept including what the statute ought to accomplish
and the means thereto. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 36, at 67-102, 285. To avoid fruitless
complexity the term "purpose" will be used throughout this Note because it seems more
suitable in light of Justice Powell's recurring admonition to consider the "entire legislative
scheme." 432 U.S. at 501-06; see Johnstone, supra at 15 & n.72.
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then reaching the final issue-the proper scope of judicial authority in
making the statute work as Congress envisioned. 39
This course of inquiry is a welcome specification of "legislative
scheme," for the term is frequently used but rarely defined. 40 Its
relevance to the issue of reviewability was not analyzed by the Morris
Court but is easily demonstrated in general terms. Because the "pur-
pose" of a given statute usually represents a balancing of competing
interests, one may describe that purpose as accomplishing a distribution
of social benefits and burdens.41 Since a statute is likely to involve " 'the
art of proliferating a purpose,' "42 in which several goals are to be
respected, the realization of any one goal may be limited by the
necessity of honoring another.
In an administrative statute, an agency is chosen as the instrumen-
tality for accomplishing this distribution of benefits and burdens. The
second line of inquiry-into the scope of agency discretion-involves
consideration of the latitude of judgment and action permitted an
agency to accomplish its designated mission. This combination of goal
and instrumentality constitutes the legislative scheme.
Once the features of a legislative scheme have been sketched in this
way, under the Morris analysis the court should consider whether
granting or denying review would be consonant with the scheme, and
thereby defer to Congress in matters of policy.43 The third and fourth
lines of inquiry meet this requirement by considering the impact and
proper scope of review.44 If, for example, a court has difficulty in
choosing a standard of review that reflects the choices made in enacting
the administrative statute, it should suspect that a grant of review
might not be consonant with the legislative scheme.45 Or, if denial of
39. See 1646-52 infra (discussion of Morris opinion). Since the Court held that review
was impliedly precluded, it did not go on to discuss the fourth line of inquiry-the exact
scope of judicial review.
40. Between Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)-the source of the
quotation in Morris-and Morris, the phrase was not used by the Court with reference to
nonreviewability. The term was used in other areas, however, such as the analogous area
of implied causes of action. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
41. See, e.g., Note, supra note 36, at 273.
42. United States v. Shirey, 359 U.S. 255, 261 (1959) (quoting Brooklyn Nat'l Corp. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 157 F.2d 450, 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 733
(1946)); see H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 32, at 1414 (purposes "may exist in hierarchies
or constellations").
43. See R. DicIr~soN, suPra note 36, at 7-9 (need for courts to defer to legislature).
44. Although defining a scope of review can be a determination of what degree of
review is useful given the constraining considerations of purpose, scope of discretion, and
impact of review, it can also involve an anticipation or revision of the overall review-
ability determination. See note 123 infra.
45. See pp. 1656, 1658-64 & notes 116 & 123 infra (further discussion and application
of the proposed course of inquiry, particularly with respect to withholding review).
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review would permit an agency to frustrate a clear congressional goal,
the court should be particularly willing to grant review. 46
If a court analyzes a legislative scheme in light of all available sources
of meaning, 47 it will be in a position to infer Congress's policy choices
for the various interests involved in the dispute, and so to determine
whether judicial review of the specific action involved would be a
replication of or a departure from those choices and preferences. The
Supreme Court's failure to pursue this course of inquiry with the
requisite attention to detail was its principal error in deciding Morris.
II. Analysis of Legislative Scheme in Morris v. Gressette:
Purpose Deflected
Morris was decided against the background of aopersistent and cen-
tury-old pattern of resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment.48 The case
involved the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA),49 which prohibits
46. See pp. 1646-56 infra (criticism of Morris Court's nonreviewability holding).
47. For examples of the sources of meaning that should be considered, see note 110 infra.
48. The history of unconstitutional voting discrimination has been extensively dis-
cussed in legal literature. For a thorough and concise recapitulation, see Derfner, Racial
Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523 (1973). Congress has passed
a series of progressively broader and more extreme antidiscrimination laws, each inspiring
successively subtler evasions. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 131-36
(1965) (description of discrimination tactics); Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 6400 be-
fore Subconi. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 60, 95
(1965) (testimony of Attorney General Katzenbach). Resistance to the enforcement of
voting equality preceded the VRA and has persisted after its enactment. U.S. COMMIssION
ON CtIL RIGHrs, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER (1975) [hereinafter cited as
TEN YEARS AFTER]; Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearings on H.R. 4249, H.R. 5538, and
Similar Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., at 17 (1969) (testimony of Howard Glickstein, Acting Dir., U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights).
This pattern of resistance has forced the use of private lawsuits to enjoin enforcement
of new election laws, notwithstanding the VRA's prohibition of such enforcement before
a law is cleared under the Act. See p. 1644 & note 52 infra. In spite of the clear lan-
guage of the VRA, its requirements for new state election laws have often been violated;
there have been attempts to enforce new laws before clearance from Washington and even
frequent failures to submit new laws for approval. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379
(1971); United States v. Garner, 349 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (cases involving elections
held pursuant to unapproved election laws); CIVIL RIGHTS OVERSIGHT SUBCOMM. OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 92D CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 IN MIssIssIPPI 5 (Comm. Print 1972) (discussing blatant non-
compliance with VRA) [hereinafter cited as OVERSIGHT REPORT]; The Enforcement of the
Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Civil Rights Oversight Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 52-56, 58, 101, 255-56 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Oversight Hearings].
Another circumstance necessitating private suits was the Justice Department's inade-
quate discharge of its duties under the VRA. This evaluation was shared by nlembers of
Congress as well as civil rights lawyers, and was corroborated by Attorney General John
Mitchell, who provoked considerable distress by his statement to the press that the De-
partment was unable to enforce the VRA. Oversight Hearings, supra at 8-9, 13, 238.
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973dd-5 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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states and other political subdivisions from using election laws to
restrict voting rights on the basis of race."° Section 5 of the VRA
prohibits covered jurisdictions from implementing new election laws
without first obtaining clearance from either the Attorney General or
the District Court for the District of Columbia.51
Beginning in 1971, South Carolina's efforts to reapportion its state
senate were the subject of extensive litigation and met with both a
section 5 objection by the Attorney General and invalidation by a South
Carolina federal district court.5 2 As a result of this litigation, the state
legislature passed the law directly involved in Morris-Act 1205a Al-
though the Act reapportioned the state senate districts, it retained the
three suspect features of a prior plan to which the Attorney General
had objected: multimember districts, numbered posts, and majority
run-off primaries. 5 4 Nonetheless, eleven days after the new plan was
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) ("No voting qualification or prerequisite
to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State
or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States
to vote on account of race or color .... ")
51. VRA § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The combination of low voter
turnout or registration and use of a "test or device," see id. § 4(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c),
brings a jurisdiction within the Act's coverage. Id. § 4(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b).
52. In November 1971, South Carolina enacted a plan, designated Act 932, to reappor-
tion its state senate. 1971 S.C. Acts 2071; see Harper v. Levi, 520 F.2d 53, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The plan included features that had been held to be indirect but effective obstructions
of the Fifteenth Amendment: multi-member districts, numbered posts, and majority run-
off primaries. Id. The majority run-off feature applied to all state elections in South
Carolina. See S.C. CODE § 7-17-600 (1976). As required by the VRA, the plan was sub-
mitted to the Attorney General for approval. See Harper v. Levi, 520 F.2d 53, 58 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). Several private suits that sought to enjoin the scheme's enforcement were filed
at the same time. They claimed that the new election scheme violated the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments and the VRA. For the chronology of the legislation and law-
suits at this stage of the case, see Memorandum for the United States of Feb. 1, 1972,
McCollum v. West, No. 71-1211 (D.S.C. 1972), reprinted in Brief for Appellees, Appendix
B, at 5a, Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977).
In March 1972, during the pendency of the private suits, the Attorney General ob-
jected to Act 932 because he was unable to conclude that the three features listed above
would not abridge minority voting rights in South Carolina. Letter from David L.
Norman, Assistant Attorney General, to Daniel R. McLeod (Mar. 6, 1972) reprinted in Ap-
pendix at 26, Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977) (filed as appendix to briefs) [here-
inafter cited as Appendix]; see Harper v. Levi, 520 F.2d 53, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1975). One month
later, in April, the three-judge court that had convened to hear the private suit held that
apportionment and residency provisions of the new election scheme violated the Four-
teenth Amendment, but also held that the scheme did not violate the Fifteenth Amend-
ment because there was no racial motivation; the court declined to consider the VRA
claim because of the Attorney General's objection. Twiggs v. West, No. 71-1106 (D.S.C.
Apr. 7, 1972), reprinted in Jurisdictional Statement, Appendix B, at 26a, Morris v. Gres.
sette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977). The court ordered the state to enact a constitutional replace-
ment within thirty days. Id. at 45a, 48a; see Harper v. Levi, 520 F.2d 53, 58 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
53. 1972 S.C. Acts 2384, S.C. CODE § 2-1-60 (1976); see Harper v. Levi, 520 F.2d 53, 58
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
54. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Appendix A, at la, Morris v. Gres-
sette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Briefj. Section 2 of the Act contained
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submitted for the Attorney General's approval, the South Carolina
federal court, which had retained jurisdiction following its rejection of
the earlier plan,5 held the new plan constitutional and ordered it into
effect.56 In spite of his duty to make an independent determination
under the VRAF' in June 1972 Attorney General Kleindienst decided
to "defer" to the judgment of the South Carolina court and thus did
not enter a section 5 objection to the senate reapportionment plan.58
Judicial review of this decision was sought and granted in the federal
District Court for the District of Columbia. The Attorney General was
ordered to perform his duty independently of the South Carolina court
and he then objected to Act 1205 nunc pro tunc59 The case of Morris
v. Gressette arose when plaintiffs, relying on this nunc pro tunc ob-
jection, tried to enjoin enforcement of Act 1205. 60
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, discerned the
pivotal question in Morris to be whether review of the Attorney
General's failure to object was authorized by the APA.01 Since the
presumption is always in favor of review602 and no provision of the
Voting Rights Act expressly precluded review of the Attorney Gen-
eral's decision,13 the Court considered whether judicial review was
the multi-member district and numbered post provisions; the majority run-off require-
ment was enacted much earlier and is applicable to all elections in the state. See note 52
supra.
55. Twiggs v. West, No. 71-1106 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 1972), reprinted in Jurisdictional State-
ment, Appendix B, at 26a, 48a, Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977); see 432 U.S. at
496.
56. Order of May 23, 1972, Twiggs v. West, No. 71-1106 (D.S.C.), reprinted in U.S.
Brief, supra note 54, Appendix B, at 9a; see Harper v. Levi, 520 F.2d 53, 58 (D.C. Cir.
1975). This sort of order-one implementing a new election law before it has been ap-
proved in accordance with the VRA-prevents the Act from achieving its purposes. See
p. 1652 & notes 106-09 inIra. Such a validation order is both premature and mislead-
ingly similar to the judgment the Attorney General himself must make. See Letter
from David L. Norman, Assistant Attorney General, to Daniel R. McLeod (June 30, 1972),
reprinted in Appendix, supra note 52, at 47 (treating decision of three-judge court in Fif-
teenth Amendment suit as res judicata in § 5 request for approval). One important dif-
ference between the two judgments is clear: the state has the burden of proof when
seeking approval for the law from the Attorney General or the District of Columbia Dis-
trict Court, whereas the burden is on private plaintiffs in preclearance suits for injunctive
relief. Harper v. Levi, 520 F.2d 53, 69-70 (D.C. Cir. 1975). For this reason, the Supreme
Court has now disallowed consideration of Fifteenth Amendment questions and judicial
implementation of reapportionment legislation before VRA clearance has been obtained.
Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656 (1975); see p. 1651 infra.
57. See p. 1650 infra.
58. See Letter, supra note 56.
59. Harper v. Kleindienst, 362 F. Supp. 742, 746 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub non. Harper
v. Le% i, 520 F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
60. Morris v. Gressette, 425 F. Supp. 331 (D.S.C. 1976), afl'd, 432 U.S. 491 (1977).
61. See 432 U.S. at 500 n.13. If review were not authorized, presumably the Attorney
General's earlier failure to object would stand as valid.
62. Id. at 501; see pp. 1636 & 1639 and notes 3-4, 26 supra.
63. 432 U.S. at 501.
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precluded by implication.6 4 Justice Powell found implicit preclusion
of review by analyzing "the role played by the Attorney General within
'the context of the entire legislative scheme' ",, created by the VRA.
The analysis considered the purpose of the VRA,66 the impact of review
on the statute's operation, 67 and the scope of the Attorney General's
discretion.As Each step of the Court's analysis overlooked important
aspects of the VRA; as a whole, the opinion seriously interferes with
the Act's purposes.
A. Purpose
After noting that a statute is automatically cleared if the Attorney
General does not object within sixty days of its submission to him, 0
the majority moved directly to consideration of a small portion of the
legislative history70 because it determined that the language of the Act
itself did not give any strong indication of Congress's purpose with
respect to judicial review. Because the purpose of the sixty-day mech-
anism was, arguably, to mitigate the severity of the section 5 remedy by
providing a quicker method of clearance than the declaratory judg-
ment route,71 and because judicial review of the Attorney General's
decisions would to some extent prolong the process, 72 the majority
concluded that the statute impliedly precluded review. 73
The superficiality of this interpretation of legislative purpose is
initially suggested by the Court's inattention to the statute's words.
The Act expressly precluded review of certain enumerated determina-
tions by the Attorney General without mentioning the decision not to
object. 74 Justice Powell noted the omission, but he rejected a "new
64. Id. In a long series of prior opinions the Court had rejected in strong terms argu-
ments that review was impliedly precluded. See pp. 1636 & 1639 supra.
65. 432 U.S. at 501 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)).
Justice Powell used the quoted phrase four times. Id. at 501, 505 n.20, 506 nn.22 & 23.
66. Id. at 503.
67. Id. at 504-05.
68. Id. at 506-07 & nn.23 & 24. Scope of review was not considered. See pp. 1641-42 &
note 39 supra.
69. The District of Columbia District Court entered an order tolling the statutory
sixty-day period for objection when plaintiffs filed suit. Order of Aug. 11, 1972, Harper
v. Kleindienst, 362 F. Supp. 742, 745 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub non. Harper v. Levi, 520
F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1975), reprinted in Brief for Appellants, Appendix A, at la, Morris v.
Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977). Whether the suit and order were within the sixty-day time
period was disputed. Harper v. Levi, 520 F.2d 53, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
70. 432 U.S. at 503-06.
71. Id. at 501-02.
72. Id. at 503-05.
73. Id. at 505-07.
74. Section 4(b) of the Act precludes judicial review of certain factual determinations
made by the Attorney General under §§ 4, 6 & 13 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, d, k
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mechanical rule of statutory construction" that would "prevent a court
from giving effect to congressional intent that otherwise was clear
from 'the context of the entire legislative scheme.' "7 The rule of
expressio unius est exchsio alterius may be mechanical, but it is hardly
new. 7 The Court's argument that a standard tool of statutory construc-
tion must give way to " 'the entire legislative scheme' " would be less
troubling if the Court had actually examined that entire scheme.77
The Court considered the purpose and operation of the sixty-day
provision of section 5, but failed to make such inquiries about the
Act as a whole.7 8 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was an unusually
severe measure to root out a persistent and pernicious inequity.70 The
principal goal of the law was to protect racial minorities whose voting
rights were denied or diluted by the imposition of a federal clearance
authority between those voters and states that had used election laws to
abridge voting rights. s0 The severity of means chosen to implement this
goal is an indication of Congress's extreme concern for minority voters.
Because it considered only the secondary, qualifying purpose-clearing
election laws expeditiously-the opinion failed to give the primary,
remedial purpose due weight, and this failure fundamentally marred
the Court's statutory interpretation.
Moreover, Justice Powell's reasoning about the purpose of the sixty-
day alternative is weak even when considered in isolation from the
(1970 & Supp. V 1975) (e.g., percentage of eligible voters registered); see Briscoe v. Levi,
432 U.S. 404 (1977) (determination that state is within coverage of VRA nonreviewable
because review explicitly precluded by § 4(b) of Act). Compare Morris v. Gressette, 432
U.S. 491, 506 n.22 (1977) (explicit preclusion does not imply reviewability in other sections)
with id. at 508-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (taking opposite view).
75. Id. at 506 n.22 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)).
76. The rule is no stranger to the Court. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (exPressio unius rule used to
construe Rail Passenger Service Act). Whether the rule should be applied in a given case,
or rejected as "mechanical," depends on the context: in some cases the omission of a
term indicates a mere oversight, yet in other cases the explicit inclusion of analogous but
distinct terms or provisions, such as the specific prohibition of review of some de-
terminations, suggests deliberate exclusion. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458-60 (1974) (explicit authorization of
particular lawsuits suggests exclusion of others); 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3870
(2d ed. Supp. 1969) (intention to deny cause of action under Rule lOb-5 may be inferred
from creation of causes of action under analogous provisions of Securities Exchange Act).
A discussion of the importance of context in ascertaining whether an omission should
give rise to a negative implication is contained in R. DICKERSON, supra note 36, at 41, 47,
234-35.
77. Although reliance on standard rules of construction may be less adequate than
analysis of the entire legislative scheme, see p. 1640 & note 33 supra, the Court chose the
least desirable course by using neither technique effectively.
78. 432 U.S. at 499-506.
79. See note 48 supra.
80. See pp. 1643-45 supra.
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rest of the Act. He argued that provision for a sixty-day alternative to
the more protracted declaratory judgment method of clearance evinced
a congressional desire to "expedite" clearance of new laws, 1 but such
evidence as there was for this inference readily supports a much nar-
rower conclusion. The only contemporary indication of the purpose
of the sixty-day alternative 2 is a remark by Attorney General Katzen-
bach before the Senate Judiciary Committee. When read in its en-
tirety, Katzenbach's statement implies a willingness not to delay
enforcement of the many sorts of election laws that were noncon-
troversial and plainly nondiscriminatory. 3 This qualification does not
extend to the election law involved in Morris, for the use of num-
bered posts in multimember districts is the most controversial-and the
most frequently objected to-of all the types of changes submitted to
the Attorney General.8 4
With regard to statutory purpose, then, the majority opinion in
Morris is doubly weak: it does not weigh the primary purpose of the
statute, and it also misinterprets the only purpose it does consider-the
secondary purpose of expediting enforcement of clearly nondiscrimina-
tory and noncontroversial new state election laws.
81. 432 U.S. at 504.
82. An earlier version of the VRA provided only the declaratory judgment method of
preclearance, and the addition of a second method is nowhere discussed in the Senate
or House Reports on the legislation. See id. at 503 & n.18; Harper v. Levi, 520 F.2d 53,
65 n.95 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
83. When being questioned by Senator Ervin about the requirement that new laws be
cleared by a declaratory judgment proceeding in the District of Columbia, and about the
authority of federal examiners to order voters registered when those voters were made
ineligible by discriminatory laws, Mr. Katzenbach defended this unusually strong power
by saying that case-by-case adjudication of state election laws to vindicate voting rights
took too long. While noting that some Senators felt the Attorney General already had too
much power under the proposed statute, Mr. Katzenbach suggested a less harsh way for
states to have new laws approved:
Now, there may be better ways of accomplishing this. I do not know if there are.
There are some here I can imagine, a good many provisions of State law, that could
be changed that would not in any way abridge or deny the right; and we, perhaps,
except for the fact that some members of the committee, I think, including yourself,
have had difficulty with giving the Attorney General discretion on some of these
things-perhaps this could be improved by applying it only to those laws which the
Attorney General takes exception to within a given period of time. Perhaps that
would remove some of the burdens.
Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 237 (1965); see OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 48, at 11 (sixty-day alternative in-
tended to provide for changes that "could readily be assessed as nondiscriminatory"). The
interpretation in text is buttressed by the fact that the overwhelming majority of sub.
missions to the Attorney General are of the clearly nondiscriminatory, noncontroversial
kind. S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 17, relprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 774, 783; Derfner, supra note 48, at 579 n.245.
84. S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, retprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 774, 783; Derfner, supra note 48, at 579 n.245. One may therefore argue that the
"expediting" purpose was irrelevant in Morris. See p. 1650 infra.
It is interesting to note that even while the Attorney General was justifying his def-
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B. Scope of Administrative Discretion
The scope of the discretion granted to the Attorney General by the
Act was discussed in two footnotes in the Court's opinion. 5 The
majority interpreted the Act's purpose in such a way that not even an
abrogation of the Attorney General's statutorily imposed duty would
be subject to judicial review.86 They did not consider it significant
that such a broad scope of unreviewable discretion might provide the
Attorney General with an opportunity to trade votes in a Presidential
election in exchange for approval of an election law.87 Although this
may merely indicate faith in the Attorney General's integrity, as Justice
Powell asserted, it is still remarkable that the Court specifically in-
cluded a deliberate failure to enforce the Act among those decisions
Congress intended to be unreviewable.
8
Two important features of the Attorney General's scope of authority
under the VRA were overlooked by the Morris opinion. According to
his own regulations, by which he is bound,89 the determination the
Attorney General is required to make is essentially similar to that
which would be made by the District of Columbia District Court in a
declaratory judgment proceeding. 90 In adldition, the VRA's interposi-
erence to the South Carolina court, he admitted that Act 1205 was discriminatory. Mem-
orandum of the United States in Response to the Court's Order of May 16, 1973 (filed
July 16, 1973), Harper v. Kleindienst, 362 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1973), reprinted in Brief
for Appellants, Appendix B, at 4a, 8a, Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977).
85. Id. at 506 n.23 & 507 n.24.
86. Id.
87. Compare id. (possibility of politically motivated abuse by Attorney General given
"no weight" by majority) with id. at 507-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's
definition of Attorney General's unreviewable scope of authority).
88. Id. at 507 n.24. More often, courts leave open the possibility of review in cases of
extraordinary administrative error, such as a relinquishing of enforcement responsibility.
See, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 574 (1975). Justice Powell stated that there
was "no evidence" of such an abuse in Morris, although the D.C. District Court found
that the Attorney General had not fulfilled his statutory duty and had to be ordered
to do so. Harper v. Kleindienst, 362 F. Supp. 742, 745-46 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub nom.
Harper v. Levi, 520 F.2d 53, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This finding was accepted even by the
Attorney General. U.S. Brief, supra note 54, at 20-36. The D.C. Circuit characterized the
Attorney General's deferral as "improperly relinquish[ing] his responsibility .... ", 520
F.2d at 67. The Attorney General himself characterized the deferral as "not authorized by
law." U.S. Brief, supra note 54, at 31.
89. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1959) (Secretary of the Interior bound
by own regulations in dismissing Department employee); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363,
388-89 (1957) (Secretary of State bound by own regulations in dismissing Department
employee).
90. 28 C.F.R. § 51.19 (1977) (burden of proof in 60-day proceeding same as in declara-
tory judgment in D.C. District Court). The similarity of the Attorney General's decision
to a traditional judicial decision argues for reviewability. See pp. 1654-55 infra; Letter,
supra note 56 (Attorney General's function under § 5 is to review submitted legislation
"as nearly as possible in the same manner that the District Court for the District of
Columbia would").
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tion of central federal authorities, rather than local federal courts,
between covered jurisdictions and their new election laws strongly
suggests that the Attorney General is required to make an independent
determination. Since Congress wanted to ensure the uniformity of a
central authority and to avoid possible biases of local federal judges,
deference to local courts contravenes this goal.91 This inference from
the structure of the Act is corroborated by the Attorney General's
own construction of section 5-that it is vital to the VRA's efficiency
that he make an independent determination.92
C. Scope of Review
Although the Court found the decision nonreviewable without ad-
dressing questions of scope of review, the very narrow scope of the
particular judicial review requested in this case significantly diminishes
its delaying effect.93 The Court could have limited a holding of review-
ability to cases where the Attorney General appears to have relinquished
his enforcement responsibility. This scope of review was advocated in
the Attorney General's amicus brief; 94 the delaying impact of such re-
view would also be minimized because there was no factual dispute
between the plaintiffs and the agency. Nor did plaintiffs urge the Court
to second-guess an agency's expert judgment by revising a substantive
decision: all that plaintiffs asked was that the Attorney General's in-
dependent discretion be exercised.
D. Impact of Review
After considering the legislative scheme, the Morris Court then dis-
cussed the impact of review on the two interests most deeply involved
91. When the VRA was passed in 1965, the central clearance provision was justified
in neutral terms of "uniformity." See, e.g., II CONO. REC. 10354-55 (1965) (remarks of
Sen. Hart). But see id. at 8839 (remarks of Sen. McClellan) (perception that central clear-
ance represented mistrust of Southern judges). When amendments to abolish this provi-
sion were considered in later debates on extending the VRA, proponents of the Act were
more frank about its purpose. See 115 CONG. REC. 38486 (1969) (remarks of Rep. Mc-
Culloch) (D.C. court "friendly to the cause of civil rights"); 121 CoNG. REC. 16900-01
(1975) (remarks of Rep. Edwards) (central clearance protects against "local pressures and
customs").
92. The Justice Department's brief made this interpretation very clear. U.S. Brief,
supra note 54, at 20-30. The correctness of the D.C. District Court's holding that the
Attorney General's decision was reviewable is corroborated by subsequent legislative his-
tory. The floor manager of the 1975 extension of the Act praised the decision's affirmance
on the House floor immediately before passage and the decision was noted in the Senate
Report on the legislation. 121 CONG. REc. 25217 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); S. Rr'.
No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, re1)rinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 774, 784.
93. The delaying effect was merely asserted by the majority. See 432 U.S. at 503-06.
94. The Attorney General argued that judicial review should be limited to such an
improper relinquishing of responsibility. U.S. Brief, supra note 54, at 29-30.
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in VRA disputes-state governments and minority voters. The majority
asserted that the effect of review on states would be to " 'add
acrimony,'"95 because it might "delay the implementation of validly
enacted, nondiscriminatory state legislation." 90 The extent, frequency,
and likelihood of dilatory uses of judicial review, however, were not
discussed. Indeed, it is apparent that Justice Powell's assessment of
the potential impact of judicial review was unrealistic, and that any
possible impact would probably be consonant with the statute's pur-
pose.97 After Connor v. Waller,98 decided before Morris, deference to
district court decisions in private pre-enforcement suits will not recur
because district courts are no longer allowed to make the type of pre-
mature judgment to which Attorney General Kleindienst deferred.99
In this sense, the particular review requested was unique and could
have no delaying effect on the approval of future election laws.
The potential impact of granting the narrow scope of review re-
quested was thus much smaller than the Court suggested; that impact
certainly appears acceptable when viewed in the context of other cases
where the Court has granted more intrusive review. 100 Indeed, since
elections need not be delayed pending approval of a new election law,
it is not clear from the opinion that the delaying impact of review could
ever be significant. Elections can simply be held in accordance with the
status quo in the jurisdiction.' 0 ' Above all, should it ever come to a
choice between imposing the risk of a discriminatory voting law upon
minorities and imposing the risk of administrative delay upon an
enacting jurisdiction, CongTess's value choice in the VRA is plainly
discernible. The Court must be guided in resolving reviewability issues,
as it was not in Morris, by Congress's policy in the statute.
The Court briefly considered the impact on minority plaintiffs of
withholding review and found that the opportunity to file private
95. 432 U.S. at 504 n.19 (quoting Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 541 (1973)).
Justice Powell uses the phrase to make a point different from that made in the earlier
Georgia case.
96. 432 U.S. at 503.
97. See OVERSIGHT REPORT, su.ra note 48, at 11 ("Congress intended that the burden
of delay fall upon the submitting jurisdiction."); cf. pp. 1638-39 supra (whether a given
consideration should influence a reviewability decision depends on the statute's purpose).
98. 421 U.S. 656 (1975).
99. Additionally, the Attorney General had discontinued the policy of deference to
such premature decisions. U.S. Brief, supra note 54, at 10; see Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S.
491, 497 n.8 (1977).
100. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975); Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The latter case is discussed at pp. 1656-64 infra.
101. The VRA covers only changes in state election laws, not election laws generally.
If the law preceding that submitted to the Attorney General was in force before Nov. 1,
1964, it is specifically exempt from the VRA's coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970 & Supp.
V 1975).
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suits under the Fifteenth Amendment mitigated that impact sufficiently
to "reinforce" the denial of review.' 02 This may mean that the Court
found such suits an adequate remedy, even when discriminatory legisla-
tion is not objected to by an erring Attorney General. 03 Congress,
however, found that private Fifteenth Amendment suits were not
adequate, a finding the Court noted but did not evaluate. Since the
purpose of section 5 in the VRA is to avoid the need for private suits,
the Court's analysis seems precisely backward.
10 4
The impact on minority voters of denying review is not limited to
remitting them to private suits. As Justice Marshall noted in dissent, 0 1
once an election is held under a discriminatory law, and only prospec-
tive relief is granted upon a subsequent determination of the law's
infirmity,10 6 it may be years before another opportunity to exercise
the franchise arises. Since the VRA expires in 1982,107 postponement
in these circumstances may lead to permanent denial of the Act's pro-
tection.'08 When the Attorney General's decision to permit a covered
jurisdiction to enforce a discriminatory election law out of deference
to a local court is held unreviewable, the impact on the people pro-
tected by the statute is plainly inconsistent with the aim of extinguish-
ing "nearly a century of widespread resistance to the Fifteenth Amend-
ment." 0 9
III. Refinement of the Morris Analysis of Legislative
Scheme for Inferring Nonreviewability
A close reading of the Morris opinion indicates that its analysis-
an examination of the legislative scheme and the impact of review on
the scheme-should be improved in three ways. First, available sources
102. 432 U.S. at 505.
103. See pp. 1649 & 1650 and notes 88 & 94 suPra.
104. See 432 U.S. at 504-06. Justice Powell echoed appellees' argument that the per-
ceived inadequacy of Fifteenth Amendment suits before the VRA was diminished by the
enactment of that law, Brief for Appellees at 31-32, but whatever validity that contention
may have is undercut to the extent that the Attorney General is allowed to relinquish
his decisionmaking authority to local federal district courts-the very forums avoided by
the VRA, see p. 1650 & note 91 supra.
105. 432 U.S. at 516-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106. Judicial invalidation of an election is unlikely. See note 108 infra (citing sources);
Starr, Federal Judicial Invalidation as a Remedy for Irregularities in State Elections, 49
N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1092, 1099-1108 (1974).
107. In 1975 the VRA was extended until 1982. Pub. L. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973dd-5 (Supp. V 1975)).
108. See Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 516-18 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Allen
v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 593-94 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part) (noting
futility of prospective relief).
109. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) (describing goal of VRA).
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of meaning should be more thoroughly canvassed. 110 Second, the four-
phase inquiry into purpose, scope of agency discretion, scope of review,
and impact should be made more specific and focused. Finally, the
interdependency of the four phases of inquiry should be considered.
The first refinement responds to the Morris Court's disregard of
important information about the VRA. The context of the Act's
passage, the continuing resistance to its enforcement, and the congres-
sional concern for the protection of minority voting rights occasioned
by these conditions and evidenced in the legislative history were all
overlooked by the majority.11' Moreover, although the agency's perspec-
tive on the legislative scheme is frequently valuable, 1 2 Justice Powell
gave no explicit weight to the Attorney General's amicus brief arguing
for review. 113 Finally, the implication contained in the statutory
language-that review was not precluded-was noted by Justice Powell
in a footnote but given little weight. 14
Next, the four-phase inquiry into purpose, scope of agency discre-
tion, permissible scope of review, and impact of review needs to be
made more focused and specific. No amount of information about a
legislative scheme will be very useful unless each of the four lines of
inquiry is detailed enough to detect truly significant indicia of con-
gressional policy. The following considerations add specificity to the
idea of a legislative scheme as defined earlier."15
110. These sources include:
i. The text of the particular administrative statute;
ii. The circumstances surrounding the statute's enactment;
iii. Legislative history;
iv. Experience with the statute's administration, based on briefs or affidavits from
agency personnel as well as parties seeking or opposing review.
111. See pp. 1646-48 supra.
112. But see United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 n.25 (1975)
(Court will give little weight to SEC argument that contradicts earlier position held by
that agency).
113. See pp. 1649-50 supra.
114. See pp. 1646-47 supra.
115. See pp. 1640-43 supra (definition of "legislative scheme"); cf. pp. 1664-65 infra
(generalized version of four-phase inquiry); pp. 1656-64 infra (discussion of Overton Park
based on four lines of inquiry). Courts and scholars have recognized the importance of
some of the factors identified here, see, e.g., Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249-51 (1st
Cir. 1970); Mahinka, supra note 21, at 35-48; Saferstein, supra note 17, at 382-95;
Witherspoon, supra note 25, at 796-800, but most have failed to weight the various re-
viewability factors they propose so as to replicate the weighting of values in the relevant
statute.
The proposed course of inquiry is not intended to displace the general principle that
courts should be slow to find review precluded by implication in cases involving harm to
constitutionally protected interests or an agency exceeding its statutory jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 303-04 (2d Cir. 1971); Hahn v.
Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1251 (Ist Cir. 1970). Nor is this proposal meant to revise the
general presumption in favor of review, see p. 1645 & note 62 supra; it it only intended to
provide a focused method for moving beyond the threshold of that presumption in a
given case.
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With respect to purpose," 0 the Morris Court should have noted that
the plaintiffs requesting review were the particular beneficiaries of the
legislative scheme, that the means chosen were extreme and qualified
by a relatively narrow subsidiary purpose, and the balancing of interests
heavily favored minority voters over covered states. The Court might,
in addition, have interpreted the scope of the Attorney General's dis-
cretion 117 more narrowly had it noted that only one factor was to
116. The inquiry into purpose might be broken down as follows:
i. What is the relation of any class of persons to a public good the law sought to
promote or public evil it sought to eliminate (e.g., direct or indirect recipients of a
benefit or obligation)? See p. 1642 & note 41 supra.
ii. Were the means chosen for this objective minimal, substantial but qualified, or
extreme?
iii. To what extent do the means chosen represent a policy judgment, or a balancing
of competing interests, that must be weighed against the good or evil addressed
by the statute? See pp. 1641-45 supra.
This definition of purpose may appear to be a disguised standing requirement, but it is
not. The combination of these three factors is designed to detect aggregates of several
(possibly competing) statutory goals. The existence of such an aggregate may weigh against
reviewability because to the extent that there is less clear "law to apply," and to the
extent that there are several goals or classes of beneficiaries, the more likely is judicial
review to be errant, ad hoc, and dissonant in relation to the scheme's operation. See p.
1656 & note 123 infra. For a discussion of problems of adjudicating controversies involving
several competing goals, see Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious
Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1534-42 (1973).
117. Scope of agency discretion could be more specifically inquired into as follows:
i. To what extent is the agency charged with managing a given activity efficiently
rather than encouraging or discouraging an activity?
ii. How much responsibility is left with the agency for developing the policy of the
scheme, either because of the failure of Congress to agree on some points or to an-
ticipate the needs of changing circumstances?
iii. To what extent is the agency charged with conflict resolution, and to what ex-
tent is it bound to follow specific principles in doing so?
iv. To what extent, in light of the above only, are informal decisionmaking and
"technical expertise" necessary to the statute's operation?
The issue of leaving an agency with the responsibility for developing the policy of a
legislative scheme is discussed in Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative
Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1041, 1054-55, 1072-75 (1975).
The significance of agency expertise, in general and particularly in its bearing upon
judicial oversight of administrative action, continues to be hotly debated. For a range
of views on this issue, see Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 33-37 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); id. at 66-68 (Bazelon, C.J., concuning); id. at 68-69
(separate statement of Leventhal, J.); id. at 110-12 (Wilkey, J., dissenting); Freedman,
suPra at 1056-64; Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. CHI.
L. REv. 681 (1972). The need for informal decisionmaking and technical expertise may
seem unpersuasive as an argument against reviewability because such expertise can be
imparted to a reviewing court. For another reason, however, review in such a case may
be problematic. An administrative law judge may well have a day-to-day factual per-
spective that allows him, for example, to evaluate a Social Security disability claim against
the entire spectrum of claimants and to develop at least that part of fairness that is
uniformity. In this setting, as well as many analogous examples of informal action, the
occasional intervention of a court is most likely to create anomalously favorable outcomes
for a few beneficiaries rather than more "accurate" dispositions. See National Center for
Administrative Justice, Final Report, Study of the Social Security Administration Hearing
and Appeals Process, Part V-Judicial Review 253 (unpublished report 1977).
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govern his decision-whether an election law has the purpose or
effect of abridging minority voting rights-and there is little doubt that
avoiding this abridgement was the dominant purpose on which Con-
gress agreed in passing the Act.118 Moreover, in considering whether
an appropriate scope of review 19 might be fashioned, it would have
been appropriate to hold that the review requested-to compel exercise
of statutory enforcement responsibility that had been relinquished-
was sufficiently narrow to insulate the Attorney General's judgment
from the danger of excessive judicial revision.
Indeed, even a broader scope of review might have been appropriate
in Morris; in contrast with legislative schemes in which the administra-
tive decisionmaking is either more technical or more open-ended, the
Attorney General's section 5 determinations involve expertise possessed
by courts.120 Finally, the Court should have devoted more attention to
the possible impact of its reviewability holding.121 The majority failed
to consider whether the foreseeable impact of granting review was more
consonant with the overall distribution of benefits and burdens in the
statute than was the impact of denying review. As a result, black voters
in South Carolina, on behalf of whom Congress fashioned one of the
most extreme remedies in American history, were denied the very pro-
tection Congress took such pains to provide.
122
118. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 536-38 (1973).
119. Once a court has outlined the salient features of a legislative scheme in some de-
tail, see notes 116 & 117 suPra, it can consider the proper role of judicial review in the
scheme:
i. Is it inappropriate for a court to review the agency decision involved either because
of the absence of congressional guidelines with which to evaluate the facts and the
agency's action or because of an especially unusual or technical factual issue?
ii. Is it improper for a court to review the decision, either in light of the proposed
four lines of inquiry or because of separation of powers?
The last factor should be construed to cover an exceedingly narrow range of situations.
See, e.g., Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122, 128-33 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc) (holding non-
reviewable classification of ships in national defense reserve fleet).
120. See pp. 1659-62 infra.
121. The essential issue here is whether the granting of review would alter or replicate
the balance of values and distribution of benefits and obligations implicit in the legisla-
tive scheme's purpose and scope of discretion, as defined in notes 116-17, 119 supra.
122. This criticism of the Court's opinion is open to the objection that it overstates the
effect of the holding on minority voting rights in South Carolina, since the Attorney Gen-
eral still retains his enforcement powers under the VRA. This argument has two weak-
nesses. First, once a discriminatory law has been cleared under § 5, the Attorney General
is powerless to mitigate that law's discriminatory effect. He can only object to discrimina-
tion in connection with electing state senators in South Carolina if the state changes its
senate election scheme before 1982. See p. 1652 & notes 107-08 supra. More importantly,
under the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of § 5, the Attorney General may be
unable to act even if South Carolina's method of electing state senators changes be-
fore 1982: whatever level of discrimination is implicit in Act 1205 may become a "safe
harbor" so that future changes, as long as they are not more discriminatory than Act 1205,
may not be objected to in a § 5 proceeding. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 139-42
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The third proposal for refinement of the Morris analysis of legisla-
tive scheme requires that relationships among the four lines of inquiry
be explored with care. In particular, a court must consider what scope
of review is consonant with the legislative scheme-the competing
statutory purposes and the agency's discretion in resolving them-before
it makes its determination of reviewability. If, as in Morris, there is a
form of review that meshes well with the scheme, the APA's presump-
tion of reviewability will be difficult to overcome. But if the permis-
sible scope of review is so narrow as to make judicial review an im-
potent formality, 12 3 one may suspect that the action has indeed been
"committed to agency discretion by law."
IV. Applying the Method: A Close Look at Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe
The proposed refinements of the Morris analysis of legislative scheme
emerge from a close examination of the opinion in that case. This
refined Morris analysis can be applied to the landmark case of Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,124 thereby producing a more
(1976); id. at 146 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Both of these points were alluded to by Justice
Marshall in dissent in Morris. 432 U.S. at 517.
The second weakness of the argument that the Attorney General retains his power to
act is more basic. When a court insulates an abuse of official responsibility from judicial
correction, that holding does not become innocuous by virtue of the mere probability that
officials will not avail themselves of the holding's potential for abuse. See Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (danger of Court's decision
approving internment of Japanese Americans extends beyond immediate circumstances
because its principle "lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority").
123. See Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc) (finding of
implicit nonreviewability appropriate when permissible scope of review so narrow as to
make judicial review merely "precatory"). This problem-granting a uselessly narrow
scope of review when the legislative scheme indicated that the agency decision probably
should have been found nonreviewable instead-is exemplified by the Court's decision in
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975). See Note, Dunlop v. Bachowski and the Limits
of Judicial Review under Title IV of the LMRDA: A Proposal for Administrative Reform,
86 YALE L.J. 885, 889-903 (1977).
Another way to look at scope of agency discretion and scope of review is to note that
they are inversely related: a sufficiently wide scope of discretion may make the appropriate
scope of review so narrow as to imply nonreviewability. Even advocates of a very narrow
definition of nonreviewability concede this. See, e.g., Mahinka, supra note 21, at 5-6.
The issues of scope of review and reviewability may be different only in formulation. If
a given agency action involves two determinations, a court can achieve the same result
either by finding judicial review precluded as to one but not the other, or by finding the
action reviewable but only one of the determinations within the scope of review. This is
made even clearer by Bachowski. See Note, supra (discussing relation between review-
ability and narrow scope of review in Court's decision to allow review of Secretary of
Labor's decision not to sue under LMRDA). Similarly, in his discussion of scope of review,
Professor Jaffe uses similar techniques to modify what seems elsewhere in his book to be
an argument for reviewability in all cases. See L. JAFFE, supra note 12, at 572-73.
124. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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thorough and persuasive interpretation of the legislative scheme in-
volved in that case.
The legislative genesis of the Overton Park controversy was statutory
language in a provision of the Department of Transportation Act of
1966 (DOTA),125 and an identical provision of the Federal Aid High-
way Act of 1968 (FAHA),'126 both of which restrained the Secretary of
Transportation from approving the expenditure of federal funds for
interstate highways through parkland. These provisions are part of a
general plan to develop an efficient national transportation system;'
2 T
the Acts spell out the procedures and decisionmaking authority by
which that objective is to be attained.
Overton Park involved a plan to route the Memphis portion of In-
terstate 40 through one of that city's parks. In December 1969, thirteen
years after the initial route approval 2s and after thousands of residents
along the park route had been moved and hundreds of buldings had
been destroyed, 129 various plaintiffs filed the complaint in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,130 which requested judicial re-
view under the APA of the routing decision and a halt to the highway's
construction.13 ' The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall,
held that whether the Secretary of Transportation's decision was re-
viewable was a question "easily answered" in the affirmative.1 32 Al-
though the opinion inferred a very strong congressional preference for
park preservation over other values from rather equivocal materials,
133
125. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
126. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970) (amended 1976).
127. Mashaw, The Legal Structure of Frustration: Alternative Strategies for Public
Choice Concerning Federally Aided Highway Construction, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1973).
128. After subsequent studies of alternate routes, the initial 1956 decision was re-
affirmed several times. Affidavit of Edgar H. Swick, Deputy Director of Bureau of Public
Roads, Department of Public Roads, U.S. Department of Transportation, reprinted in
Appendix at 27, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)
(filed as appendix to briefs) [hereinafter cited as Overton Appendix]; Letter from F.C.
Turner to Secretary John A. Volpe (Oct. 14, 1969), reprinted in Overton Appendix, supra
at 39; see Citizens to Preserve Overton ,Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 432 F.2d 1307, 1311-12 (6th
Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
129. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 309 F. Supp. 1189, 1195 (W.D.
Tenn.), aff'd, 432 F.2d 1307, 1312 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Affidavit
of Edgar H. Swick, sutra note 128, at 28; Letter from David M. Pack, Commissioner, Ten-
nessee Department of Highways to Rex M. Whitton, reprinted in Overton Appendix, supra
note 128, at 67; Affidavit of Virgil A. Rawlings, Regional Right-of-Way Engineer, Ten-
nessee Department of Highways, reprinted in Overton Appendix, supra note 128, at 128,
129-30.
130. 309 F. Supp. 1189 (W.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 432 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401
U.S. 402 (1971).
131. 309 F. Supp. at 1194.
132. 401 U.S. at 410.
133. See Note, supra note 21, at 1133.
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the Court's definition of the scope of review on remand implicitly
modified its interpretation of the statute.134
A. Purpose
The Overton Court analyzed the question of implicit preclusion of
review by deciding whether there was "law to apply"; 135 the majority
found such law in a dominant congressional purpose to preserve park-
land from being taken to build higiways.136 Application of the refined
Morris analysis of legislative scheme shows this interpretation to be
too simple. As in Morris, the scheme involved a primary purpose, a
subsidiary purpose, and a qualification of the subsidiary purpose, and
the Court considered only the second of these.
The two statutes involved, the DOTA and FAHA, were primarily
concerned with creating an efficient national transportation system . 3
7
Unlike the scheme in Morris, the legislative scheme was a general wel-
fare program that was not intended to benefit an isolable group of
persons. 38 While the plaintiffs in Morris sought to invoke review based
on the VRA's primary purpose, the plaintiffs in Overton Park argued
that the statutes' subsidiary purpose of protecting parks had been
abrogated. The subsidiary purpose in the DOTA and FAHA, however,
was subject to a very broad qualification: the Secretary was prevented
from taking parkland only where there were "feasible and prudent"
alternatives. 39 This qualification reflects a congressional desire, evident
in the legislative history, to avoid the excessive disruption and destruc-
tion of homes and businesses that might be entailed in the routing of
highways through developed parts of cities rather than through urban
parks. 14
0
B. Scope of Agency Discretion
How the Court defined scope of agency discretion is central to an
understanding of Overton Park. The Court grounded its finding of
134. See p. 1662 infra.
135. 401 U.S. at 410-13.
136. Id. at 411, 413.
137. See FAHA, 23 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (amended 1976); DOTA, 49
U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
138. Mashaw, supra note 127, at 34.
139. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970) (amended 1976); 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
140. See S. REP. No. 1340, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1968) (other "high priorities" must
be weighed; use of parkland preferable to moving large numbers of people); H. REP. No.
1584, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1968) (provision meant to broaden, not narrow, Secretary's
discretion to include consideration of several factors, such as disruption of community and
commercial patterns).
1658
Vol. 87: 1636, 1978
Statutory Interpretation
reviewability on a very narrow reading of agency discretion,. 4 ' and
application of the scope of discretion portion of the proposed course
of inquiry to Overton Park yields the most persuasive evidence for a
contrary holding.
Even more than in Morris, inattention to statutory language marred
the Court's interpretation in Overton Park. First, it is not clear that the
two provisions allegedly violated by Secretary Volpe applied to the facts
of Overton Park at i11, since the precise words restraining the Depart-
ment of Transportation from funding highways through parkland
applied only to parks "of national, State, or local significance as de-
termined by the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction
thereof."' 142 Given that both the Memphis City Council 143 and the
Memphis Parks Commission144 officially expressed a preference for
the Overton Park route over proposed alternatives, it cannot simply be
assumed, as the Court apparently did, that this requirement was met.
The argument that the relevant statutes had a "clear" and "plain"
meaning145 becomes even less persuasive if one turns to the more de-
141. 401 U.S. at 411. The Court's opinion implied that a statute giving an agency a
narrow and specific mandate argued for review while a statute allowing a wide-ranging
balancing of interests might argue against reviewability. This dichotomy, if not the
Court's application of it here, is persuasive. See pp. 1654 & 1656 and notes 116, 117, &
123 supra.
The Court's construction of the statutes turns them into a near-prohibition of routing
highways through parks. See Mashaw, supra note 127, at 43.44. The method by which the
Court accomplished this, and its implications for reviewability, are important: a question
of fact was turned into a question of law. Aside from its reservation of "unique" and
"unusual" cases, 401 U.S. at 411, 413, the Court's treatment of scope of agency discretion
transmuted the factual issue-was discretion abused?-into a jurisdictional issue-was park-
land involved? Cf. J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, supra note 18, at 785-87 (ability to frame
claim to judicial review in terms of interpretation or procedure rather than of fact or
judgment more likely to invoke review). The Court's analysis of scope of agency discretion
has been criticized. See Project, Federal Administrative Law Developments-1971, 1972
DUKE L.J. 115, 317-29; The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. Rav. 3, 315-25 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Term]; Note, supra note 21, at 1126-27. The Court continues to
use this technique of transmuting factual questions into jurisdictional questions when
analyzing reviewability. In the recently decided case of Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United
States, 98 S. Ct. 566 (1978), the Court invalidated an EPA regulation promulgated pursuant
to a statute authorizing the Administrator to control the emission of asbestos, even though
the statute expressly precluded such review. Cf. Caulfield v. United States Dep't of Agric.,
293 F.2d 217, 228 (5th Cir. 1961) (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (courts rationalize own percep-
tions of regulatory policy in terms of jurisdiction or statutory construction when finding
exceptions to statutory preclusions of review).
142. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970) (amended 1976); 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
143. Resolution Concerning Expressway Though Overton Park; reprinted in Overton
Appendix, supra note 128, at 26. The Memphis City Council Resolution suggested that the
Secretary had abrogated his responsibility to them. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 407, 408 & n.17.
144. Memphis Park Commission Resolution, reprinted in Overton Appendix, supra
note 128, at 119.
145. 401 U.S. at 411-13.
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tailed examination of scope of agency discretion proposed in this Note.
The routing of highways involves several competing interests, the op-
timal balancing of which is a very delicate task. The interests potentially
affected by choice of highway route include pockets of minority or low
income housing, less densely populated and more affluent suburban
fringes, downtown businesses that employ workers from an entire
urban area, and parks or wilderness areas of environmental or aesthetic
value.146 In light of this complexity, it is understandable that Congress
failed to give the Department of Transportation a narrow and un-
ambiguous mandate.
The question of the amount of responsibility delegated to the agency
to develop the policy of the scheme is at the heart of Overton Park. Al-
though the Court rejected the Secretary's contention that he was to
perform a "wide-ranging balancing of competing interests,' 147 a study
of the process of enactment of both the 1966 and 1968 provisions148
reveals a notable similarity: in both laws the language finally enacted
reflects a compromise between the Senate and the House, whose
strongly opposing views resulted in equivocal language that left to the
agency the policy tasks of balancing and reconciliation. In 1966, the
Senate's effort to prohibit the Secretary from taking parkland unless
there were no "feasible" alternatives149 was modified by the House, in
conference, to expand the Secretary's discretion by narrowing the
prohibition to cases where the alternatives were neither feasible nor
"prudent."' 50 This commendation to the Secretary's prudence-as a
conscious result of compromise between the Senate and the House-
suggests a good deal more discretion than was found by the Supreme
Court.' 51
146. See Mashaw, supra note 127, at 3-4.
147. 401 U.S. at 411; see Brief for the Secretary of Transportation, Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), at 20-21 [hereinafter cited as Transporta-
tion Brief].
148. For additional discussion of the legislative history, see Project, supra note 141;
1970 Term, supra note 141. A thorough chronology of the legislation concerning parks and
highways is found in Gray, Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 32 MD.
L. REV. 327 (1973), although that article unduly minimizes the diversity of viewpoints
regarding the legislation on the part of opposing forces within Congress.
149. S. Res. 3010, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 112 CONG. REC. 24309-10 (1966).
Legislative history of the 1966 parkland provision is sparse. But see 112 CONG. REC. 14073,
26565 (1966); S. REP. No. 1659, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1966).
150. CONF. REP. No. 2236, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3450.
151. This more discretionary interpretation is corroborated by a few comments on the
floor of the House that indicate that the purpose of the legislation was not simply to
protect parks, but rather to do so in a way that did not harm other human values
represented by residential, religious, educational, and commercial centers in a community.
See Project, supra note 141, at 321 n.24 .
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A similar process took place in 1968, when the "local approval"
language discussed above was added.152 Like the 1966 addition of the
word "prudent," the 1968 requirement expanded the number of con-
ceivable situations in which highways could be built through parks and
still be federally funded. The most dramatic evidence for the "balancing
of interests"'15 3 interpretation of the Secretary's discretion is a state-
ment made on the Senate floor in 1968 by Senator Jackson: "It is
highly important, in my judgment, to carry on the previously expressed
intent of Congress on this question of the balance that must be struck
between expanding transportation systems and the preservation of our
public parklands."1 5 4 The variety of values to be considered, 55 the
failure of Congress to agree on a narrow scope of agency discretion, 56
152. See p. 1659 supra.
The parkland preservation issue was more clearly in the limelight in 1968, when the
Department of Transportation Act was amended and an identical section was added to
the renewal of the federal funding program, the FAHA. Because of fierce battles over
highway routing throughout the nation, which spilled over into well-known lawsuits, the
lines were drawn in Congress. Controversies over the Three Sisters Bridge in Washington,
D.C., and the Brackenridge Park freeway in San Antonio, Texas, were especially well
known. See Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 400 U.S. 968 (1970) (dissents from denial of certiorari); D.C. Fed'n of
Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 434 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Mashaw, supra note 127, at 22-24,
33-51. The parkland section of the FAHA proposed by the House was less mandatory and
clear than the original DOTA parkland provision, H.R. 17134, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 17
(1968), reprinted in 114 CONG. REC. 19393, 19749 (1968), but this relaxation was rejected
by the Senate, see S. 3418, reprinted in 114 CONG. RFc. 19531 (1968) (Senate revision of bill,
rejecting more permissive House version); 114 CONG. REc. 19529-30 (1968) remarks of
Senator Jackson.
153. Cf. pp. 1642-43 suPra (discussing balancing and qualification of legislative pur-
poses). The congressional desire to qualify the subsidiary purpose of protecting parkland,
as evidenced in committee reports, has already been noted. See p. 1658 & note 140
supra. Although floor debates are less reliable than committee reports as evidence of
congressional purpose, see R. DIcKERSON, supra note 36, at 154-59 (1975); A. LENHOFF,
COMMENTS, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 787-96 (1949), the degree to which
the provisions as finally enacted were a compromise balancing conflicting values is reflected
in a lengthy exchange on the Senate floor immediately preceding the Senate's approval of
the conference version of the bill. Senator Randolph, the floor manager of the bill and
chairman of the conference committee, defended the conference version from charges that
the preference for parks had been watered down by saying that it was a hard fight and
the Senate side had done its best. 114 CONG. REG. 24032-37 (1968). Senator Cooper's re-
marks, which were relied on by Justice Marshall to counterbalance the interpretation of
the statutes advanced by the Secretary of Transportation, see p. 1660 & note 147 supra,
and by this Note, are suspect because Senator Cooper believed the bill offered too much
opportunity for routing highways through parks, and he therefore voted against the
measure. See 401 U.S. at 412 n.29; 114 CONG. Rae. 24032-33, 24038 (1968).
154. 114 CONG. REc. 19529-30 (1968) (emphasis added). Senator Jackson was responsible
for the original, and most strongly worded, version of the parkland provision in the 1966
Senate version of the DOTA. Id.
155. See pp. 1658-59 suPra.
156. See pp. 1660 & 1661 supra.
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and the technical expertise involved in highway decisionmaking' 57 are
all aspects of the scope of agency discretion that, had the Court con-
sidered them, would have argued for a much different interpretation of
the means component of the legislative scheme in Overton Park.158
C. Scope of Review on Remand
The inferences regarding purpose and scope of discretion, inasmuch
as they suggest implicit nonreviewability and an absence of clear guide-
lines for a reviewing court to apply, should have led to an affirmance
of the Sixth Circuit's denial of review. 159 The Overton Court disagreed,
however, and therefore formulated a definition of the scope of permis-
sible review on remand to the district court. The Court's directions to
the district court 60 were hedged in a way that appears to mitigate the
effect of the opinion's broad interpretation of the statute and narrow
interpretation of the Secretary's discretion.' 0 ' The lower court was
directed to consider whether the agency made an "error of judgment,"
but was admonished not to "substitute its judgment for that of the
agency."' 16 2 It was permitted to ask Transportation officials to testify
and explain their decisions, but was warned against excessive scrutiny
of "the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers."' 
3
These instructions modified indirectly and ambiguously the Court's
earlier, extreme interpretation of the parkland provisions by protecting
the Secretary's decision from overly harsh scrutiny and by holding out
the possibility that his taking of parkland in this instance might be
justifiable. Had the Court considered these issues relevant to the thresh-
old question of reviewability, as it should have done, it would have
had additional reason to deny review.
157. Some reasons for preferring the decisionmaking of an agency in the matter of
highway routing, rather than that of judicial oversight and revision, are discussed in
Note, D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe: Blessing or Burden?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
125, 132-38 (1974) (reasons include need for uniformity, developed fact-gathering ability,
and technical expertise in handling problems of highway safety).
158. See p. 1642 supra.
159. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 432 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1970),
rev'd, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
160. 401 U.S. at 413-21.
161. The broad interpretation of the statute is even more clearly expressed in the
separate opinion of Justices Black and Brennan. 401 U.S. at 421-22. The generally ac-
cepted interpretation of the Court's holding in Overton Park takes the first half of the
majority opinion, which interprets the statutes, at face value. See pp. 1658-59 supra (citing
sources); Note, 60 GEo. L. Rxv. 1101, 1105-08, 1112, 1114 (1972); Note, supra note 17, at
454-56, 463-74; Note, 1972 Wis. L. Rav. 613, 625-26. For a contrary interpretation, see p.
1663 and notes 164 & 165 infra.
162. 401 U.S. at 416.
163. Id. at 420.
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D. Impact of Review on Remand
Whether or not the remand directions were intended to be equivo-
cal,'0 4 their ambiguity compounded the inherent undesirability of
review in this case by permitting an extremely wide-ranging review. 105
The impact of that review was, predictably, strongly detrimental to the
legislative scheme. When the Court was deciding whether the Secretary's
decision should be reviewable according to the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard, the proposed course of inquiry, if applied, would have
required consideration of whether any of the foreseeable outcomes of
granting judicial review would be especially contrary to the statutory
scheme. 166 Three outcomes were foreseeable at that point. After the
case was remanded to the district court for further explanation from the
agency, that court might approve the park route, it might overturn the
park route but find another route satisfactory, or it might find no route
satisfactory.
Certainly the first outcome would be no great strain on the scheme:
164. The equivocal quality of the opinion has been noted. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,
541 F.2d 1, 34 n.74 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 941 (1976) (in discussing
proper standard of review of EPA regulations governing lead content of gasoline, court of
appeals describes Supreme Court's intent in Overton Park as "difficult to plumb"); Note,
supra note 21, at 1122, 1124 (Court's remand directions permitted substantial evidence
standard even though opinion ostensibly rejected this possibility).
165. Chief Judge Bailey Brown, after a 25-day trial, held that the Secretary had mis-
construed his authority, although his decision was reasonable within his permitted range
of discretion; the court then remanded the case to the Department of Transportation for
a routing decision in accordance with its statutory responsibility. Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873, 885 (V.D. Tenn. 1972). The Secretary then
decided that neither the park route nor any other route was acceptable, whereupon
Tennessee petitioned the court to remand to the Secretary once more on the theory that
he must find some route acceptable. The court granted the petition, but the Sixth Circuit
reversed, holding that the Secretary was not required to approve any route. Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'g Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 357 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Tenn. 1973).
Perhaps mindful of the consequences of its remand in Overton Park, the Court in
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975), made a very clear attempt to prevent an ex.ces-
sively probing review on remand, but this attempt did not succeed. See Note, supra note
123, at 899 n.55. The Court's finding of reviewability in these two cases, coupled with a
discordantly narrow scope of review, see p. 1656 & note 123 supra, appears more reason-
able when the threat of judicial review is viewed primarily as an incentive for agencies
to provide a contemporaneous statement of reasons explaining informal action. See
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 593-94 (1975 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
result in part and dissenting in part) (claiming judicial review unjustified in light of
Secretary's statement of reasons); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973) (in remanding
case to court of appeals, Supreme Court suggests Comptroller of Currency's contemporane-
ous explanation of denial of national bank charter should weigh heavily in favor of up-
holding his decision). Suggestions by the Court to this effect have been noted. See
Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rule Making: Some Recent Developments in
Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DuKE L.J. 51, 61-63; Verkuil, Judicial Review of In-
formal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. Rav. 185, 212-14 (1974); 1970 Term, supra note 141, at
321-22.
166. See p. 1642-43 and notes 43-46 supra.
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it would require as an additional cost for completing the highway only
a full statement of reasons for the routing decision, and it is frequently
urged that a statement of reasons is a salutary requirement for all in-
formal agency action.167 The costs of the second and third outcomes
would have been far greater, and the undesirable impact of these must
have been clear to the Court from the briefs. 168 The two alternate routes
passed through many churches, schools, businesses, houses, a university,
a hospital, and a home for the aged; moreover petitioners' suggestions
for further minimizing harm to the Park were either wildly impractical
or likely to be even more deleterious. 169 Finally, to abandon the Park
route would have turned the whole decade-long effort into an exercise
in futility, leaving 2,000 residents dislocated, hundreds of houses and
other buildings destroyed, and portions of the unusable highway al-
ready completed, 170 and would have been contrary to Congress's desire
to avoid such disruption. 17 ' Yet, due to the Court's extreme construc-
tion of the statute's purpose and ambiguous directions on remand, this
third possible outcome, with an impact most deleterious to the legisla-
tive scheme, was the eventual consequence of the Court's decision in
favor of reviewability.172 No highway was built at allY.
7 3
167. See Clagett, supra note 165, at 63; Gardner, The Procedures By Which Informal
Action Is Taken, 24 AD. L. REv. 155, 158-66 (1972); Rabin, Job Security and Due Process:
Monitoring Administrative Discretion through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. Cn. L.
REv. 60 (1976); cf. note 165 supra (desirability of contemporaneous statement of reasons
related to reviewability and scope of review). But see Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About
NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1973) (requirement that reasons be stated does not enhance
administrative process).
168. See p. 1657 supra and note 169 infra.
169. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 432 F.2d 1307, 1311-12 (6th Cir.
1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); id., 335 F. Supp. 873, 880-81 (W.D. Tenn. 1972) (on re-
mand); Affidavit of Edgar H. Swick, reprinted in Overton Appendix, supra note 128, at
27; Letter from David M. Pack, supra note 129, at 67. One of the petitioners' suggestions
was the use of a bored tunnel under the Park, which would have damaged the tree roots
unless it was buried so deeply as to cost over $100 million, whereas the cost of the
Secretary's proposal was about $3.5 million. Letter from F.C. Turner to John A. Volpe,
(Oct. 14, 1969), reprinted in Overton Appendix, supra note 128, at 39.
Plaintiffs claimed the Secretary failed to consider a third and more feasible alternative
to the Park route, but the court on remand held that the Secretary could reasonably have
eliminated the route in question from consideration. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873, 880-82 (W.D. Tenn. 1972) (on remand).
170. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 309 F. Supp. 1189, 1195 (W.D.
Tenn. 1970), aff'd, 432 F.2d 1307, 1312 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); id., 335 F.
Supp. 873, 877-78 (W.D. Tenn. 1972) (on remand); Affidavit of Edgar H. Swick, supra
note 128; Letter from David M. Pack, supra note 129; Affidavit of Virgil A. Rawlings, supra
note 129.
171. See p. 1658 & note 138 suPra.
172. See note 165 sukra.
173. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1212, 1213-14 (6th




A full analysis of the legislative scheme established by Congress is a
prerequisite of thorough and persuasive opinions deciding whether
judicial review of an agency's actions is precluded by implication. After
the Morris Court's serious misinterpretation of congressional policy in
the Voting Rights Act scheme, the need for a detailed course of inquiry
into the nature of a legislative scheme is more evident than ever. In
light of the requirement of judicial deference to Congress in matters
of policy, and the Supreme Court's innovative use of statutory inter-
pretation, 7 4 the Court should adopt a more attentive approach to
analysis of a legislative scheme.
174. The many and significant areas in which the Court has used statutory interpreta-
tion as an innovative tool suggest further avenues of inquiry. See, e.g., Adamo Wrecking
Co. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 566, 577 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting from Court's invalida-
tion of EPA asbestos regulation); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977) (statutory interpretation used to restrict coverage of Title VII of Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). Since the Court
clarified the conditions for implying a cause of action in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975),
the multitude of implied cause of action cases has focused great attention on the im-
portance of a "legislative scheme," although the Cort opinion, which stresses this factor,
gives little guidance about applying it. This emphasizes the need for a principled and
analytical approach to statutory construction. For an illustration of the complex statutory
interpretation problems encountered in applying the Cort test, see Abrahamson v.
Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3710 (U.S. May 15, 1978).
See note 141 sup ra.
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